

**IDENTITY, SOCIAL DISTANCE, AND  
PALESTINIAN SUPPORT FOR THE ROADMAP**

Guillermina Jasso  
New York University

Eva M. Meyersson Milgrom  
Stanford University  
and Stockholm University

March 2004

Authors' names are in alphabetical order. We thank the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and Ayoub Mustafa for kindly providing the data analyzed in this paper; Dahlia Moore, Eli Berman, Howard Rosenthal, and other participants in the Workshops on Suicide Missions sponsored by the Stanford Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law for useful discussion and comments; and the Bechtel Foundation for its generous financial support.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Suicide attacks occur in the context of a conflict between warring groups, supported by an organization and sometimes even by families and communities which proudly sacrifice their children. Their design and planning, the construction of weapons and associated equipment, the recruitment of trainers and attackers, and the actual execution all occur within a group engaged in a conflict.<sup>1</sup> Understanding the use of suicide attacks as a tactic of war requires understanding all the factors identified in the study of diplomacy and military strategy – military capability of the warring parties, terrain, payoffs and costs, etc.<sup>2</sup> But that is not enough. Understanding suicide attacks also requires heightened attentiveness to support among the general population, for suicide attacks would not long endure without popular support.<sup>3</sup> Understanding the social climate is thus a key ingredient in understanding suicide attacks.

Two related aspects of the social climate are identity and social distance. Substantial literatures across all the social sciences, discussed in Chapter Y (this volume), suggest that identity mechanisms and social distance mechanisms play important parts in individual behavior and intergroup behavior. Our point of departure is a unified framework which combines insights about identity and social distance, as well as kindred status and comparison processes. The framework yields a clear and coherent representation of each factor and of the complete set of relations among the factors.

In the unified framework, a person is viewed as a collection of identities. Each identity, in turn, is a bundle of three elements, one from each of three classes: (1) personal quantitative

---

<sup>1</sup> Of course, a lone individual may mount a suicide attack. However, most suicide attacks tend to occur as part of a group effort.

<sup>2</sup> Building on von Clausewitz' ([1832-1834] 1943) classic observation, "War is diplomacy by another means," we might say, "Suicide attacks are war by another means."

<sup>3</sup> As the terrorism analyst Brian Jenkins (quoted in Van Natta 2003) observes with respect to the suicide attacks mounted by Palestinians, "The fact that they've been able to sustain the tactic suggests that this tactic is applauded in the community." Jenkins goes on to note, ". . . and it reflects a society under considerable stress."

characteristics, such as competence, skill, holiness, or wealth; (2) personal qualitative characteristics, such as race, ethnicity, language, or religion; and (3) primordial sociobehavioral outcomes, such as status, self-esteem, or the sense of justice. In this schema, the personal quantitative characteristics provide the dimensions by which people evaluate their own and others' worth; the personal qualitative characteristics are used to structure groups and subgroups; and the primordial sociobehavioral outcomes (such as status or self-esteem) are generated by reference to the quantitative characteristics (such as schooling or wealth) within the groups and subgroups formed by the qualitative characteristics (such as race, ethnicity, or sex). To illustrate, people may derive status from their rank on schooling or wealth within a particular group.<sup>4</sup> Each identity is labeled to indicate the trio of elements, for example, "schooling-sex-status" or "wealth-country-status."

Social distance, in the unified framework, refers to the difference between the average primordial sociobehavioral outcomes attained by subgroups. For example, if men have greater schooling than women, then the average status derived from schooling will be greater among men than among women, and the difference in average status provides a measure of the a priori fundamental social distance between them.

Individuals have many identities. The configuration of identities can vary enormously across persons, as some individuals fix on one or another element from each of the three classes of elements – e.g., beauty versus wealth, race versus gender, status versus self-esteem. Identities which command large portions of a person's life become associated with that individual's personality; and sometimes special descriptives develop for such persons – power-hungry, gender-obsessed, race-conscious, materialistic, and so on.

Groups, too, become characterized by the configuration of identities among their members. Thus, we sometimes speak of a materialistic society – a society whose members

---

<sup>4</sup> The process generating a primordial sociobehavioral outcome is sometimes called a behavioral engine, and, thus, the third class of elements is sometimes referred to as the class of behavioral engines.

construct a substantial portion of their identities by reference to their material possessions – or a justice society – a society in which the salient primordial sociobehavioral outcome is the sense of justice, and it is included in a large proportion of the trios that constitute the peoples’ identities.

To each identity which commands large numbers of group members there corresponds a magnitude of social distance. Social distance thus varies depending on the content of people’s identities.

Suicide attacks have been an important Palestinian tactical weapon in the conflict with Israel since the start of the second Intifada in September 2000. According to the compilation by Berman and Laitin (this volume), the number of suicide attacks mounted from the start of the Intifada to October 23, 2003, is 95 with over 500 persons killed.<sup>5</sup> Before the second Intifada, Palestinian actions largely consisted of stone throwing, car bombs, and shootings and stabbings at open marketplaces.

Suicide attacks were introduced into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by Hamas, whose leadership, sent into Lebanese exile by Israel, had learned the tactic from Hezbollah and observed its success in driving the Israelis out of Lebanon (Mishal and Sela 2000). After Hamas mounted suicide attacks successfully, three other organizations started using it – Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Fatah (Fatah, Fatah Tanzim, and Martyrs of al-Aqsa), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). (See Berman and Laitin, this volume, for a detailed examination of the number of attacks mounted and their effectiveness.)

In this paper, we investigate the social climate among Palestinians, focusing on the effects of identity and social distance on support for key provisions of the Roadmap, the peace initiative proposed in 2002. We analyze four provisions, the first three of which are directly pertinent to support for the tactic of suicide attacks, while the fourth evokes a more general support for peace:

---

<sup>5</sup> These figures refer to the successful suicide attacks. The number of thwarted attacks is thought to be substantial. See, for example, the website of the Israeli Defense Forces ([www.idf.il](http://www.idf.il)), which reports figures for attacks carried out and attacks prevented for each month since September 2000.

- Ending incitement against Israel by all official Palestinian institutions
- Declaring an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism, and undertaking efforts to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere
- Cutting off funding and all other forms of support for groups supporting and engaging in violence and terror
- Restoring pre-Intifada links between Arab states and Israel

We focus on selected identities, in particular, status-based identities, and on social distance between Israelis and Palestinians. Our data are drawn from a probability sample of Palestinian adults carried out in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in June 2003. Our analytic procedures enable estimation of the effects of social distance within each of 16 districts (11 in the West Bank and 5 in Gaza) even without data from Israeli residents of the districts.

The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the theoretical and empirical framework. In Section 3 we report results. A short note concludes the paper.

## **2. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK**

### **2.1. Theoretical Foundation**

Sociobehavioral theory suggests a parsimonious unified framework for analyzing the part played by identity and social distance in a variety of behaviors and processes, including suicide attacks. The framework combines insights from several literatures in the social sciences, and distills them into four premises:

1. A person is a collection of identities.
2. Each identity is a bundle of three elements, one from each of three sets: (1) personal quantitative characteristics (such as beauty or wealth); (2) personal qualitative characteristics (such as race or gender); and (3) valued primordial sociobehavioral outcomes (such as status or

the sense of being justly treated).

3. A group is a collection of persons, and, therefore, can be characterized by the configurations of the members' identities.

4. Social distance between the subgroups of a population may be represented by the difference between the subgroups' average primordial outcomes.

As noted, the four premises are rooted in social scientific analyses. For example, the first and third premise are foundational in several identity models in the literature, including the identity models developed in sociology by Stryker and Serpe (1994) and Stryker and Burke (2000) and their colleagues (see also Stryker 1968; Stets and Burke 2000) and the social identity models developed in psychology by Tajfel and Turner (1979), Hogg, Terry, and White (1995), Hornsey and Hogg (2002), and their colleagues (see also Tajfel 1974; Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 2002). In these literatures, the two premises appear as "Self is a collection of identities" and "Society is a collection of selves." Similarly, the second premise, while not explicitly stated until recently, is evident in the identity literatures – for example, the primordial outcome may be self-enhancement, self-esteem, or status -- and the quantitative and qualitative characteristics which play basic parts trace their lineage to Blau's (1974) foundational analysis of the two kinds of characteristics which structure social interaction and relationships. Finally, the fourth premise is rooted in social scientific analyses of social distance; consider, for example, Komarovsky's ([1944] 1966) classical definition of social distance in Fairchild's Dictionary of Sociology: "Reserve or constraint in social interaction between individuals belonging to groups rated as inferior and superior in status."<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> There is a tension in the literature on social distance between treating social distance as a determinant and treating it as a consequence (Park 1924; Bogardus 1925; LaPiere 1938; Williams 1947; Allport 1954; Blalock 1956; Laumann and Senter 1976). Accounts focusing on social distance as a determinant highlight differences between social units (individuals in some treatments, groups in others) in their pre-existing characteristics, including race, gender, ethnicity, wealth, and status. Accounts focusing on social distance as a consequence highlight patterns of interaction such as prejudice, discrimination, liking, marrying, eating together, and so on. Of course, implicit in sociological accounts is the connection between the two. For example,

An advantage of this framework is that it is fully mathematized. Thus, it enables systematic and rigorous investigation of the birth and death of identities, their differential salience in different contexts, the part played by culture, and so on.

### **2.1.1. Status-Based Identity**

The theoretical framework can be used to investigate the operation of a full set of identities, based on various combinations of quantitative characteristics, qualitative characteristics, and primordial outcomes. In this paper, partly for data reasons (as will be seen below), we focus on identities associated with one primordial sociobehavioral outcome, namely, status. Accordingly, for simplicity and convenience and because of space constraints, we present the mathematical development for status identities only.<sup>7</sup>

In the axiomatization of status, based on Goode (1978), Sørensen (1979), and Jasso (2001), status  $S$  is represented by positive numbers and is a function of the individual's relative rank, within a group, on a quantitative characteristic, such as beauty, intelligence, or wealth:

$$S = \ln\left(\frac{1}{1-r}\right), \quad (1)$$

where  $r$  denotes the relative rank (between zero and one) on the valued quantitative characteristic. Sørensen (1979) introduced the status function, applying it to occupations, and used it as an assumption in a theory of occupational status; Sørensen's function embodies the convexity property held by Goode (1978) to be important in an individual-level status function, and was used as an individual-level assumption in Jasso (2001).

It is straightforward to see that the status described by this function bears a strong resemblance to characterizations of identity in the literature. Even when the identity model emphasizes a qualitative characteristic (such as gender or religion), the two other elements – the

---

Komarovsky's ([1944] 1966) definition (above) combines determinant elements and consequence elements.

<sup>7</sup> See Chapter Y (this volume) for discussion and analysis of justice-based identities.

valued quantitative characteristic and the primordial outcome – are always involved. Of course, identities can be associated with different primordial outcomes – for example, with self-esteem rather than with status. Thus, we refer to identities whose primordial sociobehavioral outcome is status as status-based identities or, alternatively, identities associated with deriving status.

In formulas for use in modeling small groups and in empirical work, the relative rank is specified as  $i/(N+1)$ , where  $I$  represents the absolute rank in ascending order and  $N$  represents the group or population size. Thus, the small-groups formula for  $S$  is obtained by replacing  $r$  in equation (1) with the formula above for the relative rank,

$$S = \ln \left( \frac{1}{1 - \frac{i}{N+1}} \right), \quad (2)$$

and simplifying to:

$$S = \ln \left( \frac{N+1}{N+1-i} \right). \quad (3)$$

Formulas for large populations may be thought of as the limiting case of the formula for small groups, as the group size  $N$  goes to infinity. Thus, large-population formulas will not include  $N$ .<sup>8</sup>

The computational formula (3) for status makes vivid the presence of the three elements of an identity. First, the primordial outcome is status; it is visible in the dependent variable  $S$ . Second, status is generated by rank on a personal quantitative characteristic; the rank appears as the argument  $I$ . Third, the rank is calculated by reference to a group formed by a personal qualitative characteristic; the group size  $N$  appears as an argument.

### **2.1.2. Status-Based Social Distance**

Whenever a group or population includes persons who differ in their qualitative

---

<sup>8</sup> The basic formula for the large-population case is formula (1). Additional formulas, for example, expressing status in terms of probability distribution, are presented in Jasso (2001).

characteristics – who differ, for example, in gender, race, ethnicity, religion, nativity, or any other qualitative characteristic – there is a potential for social distance between the subgroups formed by the categories of the qualitative characteristic. For example, if the group consists of all people in a country, then the possible subgroups include subgroups formed on the basis of sex, subgroups formed on the basis of race, etc. Note that choice of group in construction of the identity constrains the range of possible subgroups. For example, if the qualitative characteristic by reference to which status is generated is sex – that is,  $N$  in formula (3) is the number of persons of a given sex, and  $I$  is the individual's rank on the quantitative characteristic within the sex-specific group – then there are no sex-based subgroups and no sex-based social distance. In contrast, if the qualitative characteristic by reference to which status is generated is citizenship or geographic residence, then there can be sex-based subgroups and sex-based social distance.

Consider a society with several subgroups formed by the categories of a qualitative characteristic. The society may be at any scale; it could be a nation-state or a people aspiring to nationhood (or a firm, or a ball club, etc.). The qualitative characteristic giving rise to the subgroups could be gender, race, ethnicity, religion, nativity, occupation, discipline in a university, or any other qualitative characteristic. The proportions in the subgroups are called the subgroup split. For example, in the case of gender, the subgroup split may be 50-50 in the general population or 75-25 in particular groups; in the case of religion, the subgroup split could be 10-10-10-25-45.

Suppose further that the members of the society value a particular set of personal quantitative characteristics (of goods, or bads, that is). For example, the society might value wealth and/or beauty and/or intelligence and/or bravery and/or athletic skill, and so on.

Now suppose that all the members of the society care about status. Thus, each person has a status-based identity. The higher the rank in the distribution of the valued good, the higher the status.

To analyze social distance, we begin by characterizing each subgroup by the average  $S$

among its members.<sup>9</sup> Letting  $c$  denote a category of the qualitative characteristic giving rise to the subgroups and  $E(\cdot)$  denote the average, average  $S$  is given by  $[E(S)]_c$ .<sup>10</sup>

Next we define the gap between two subgroups. Letting  $c_A$  and  $c_B$  denote two categories of the qualitative characteristic and  $G$  denote the gap between them, we write:

$$G = |[E(S)]_{c_A} - [E(S)]_{c_B}|. \quad (4)$$

The gap  $G$  ranges from zero to high positive values. For a given qualitative characteristic, there is a set of  $G$ s corresponding to the set of  $G$ s for all pairs of categories. For example, while gender has only one pair of categories and hence only one possible gap, ethnicity could have 3, 6, 10, 15 pairs of categories, and so on, and hence could have that many gaps. If all  $G$ s are equal to zero, then there are no gaps between any of the subgroups; all subgroups are equal.

The heart of the social distance model is the premise that social distance between two subgroups varies with the gaps in primordial outcomes between the two subgroups. This idea is squarely in the sociological tradition in which relations between groups involve relations between properties of groups (Merton [1949, 1957] 1968; Smelser 1967; Eisenstadt 1968). Another way to think about this premise is to use Newtonian insights and view the relation between two subgroups as the relation between the center of gravity on a primordial outcome in each subgroup. Note that in this model, prejudice, discrimination, conflict, and other phenomena set in motion by social distance cannot arise unless there is a gap between the average primordial outcomes – for example, a gap between the average status – across the two subgroups. Moreover, social distance is reduced when the gap decreases; and social distance disappears completely when the gap is

---

<sup>9</sup> Of course, as already noted, social distance also arises from the difference between subgroup averages on primordial outcomes other than status.

<sup>10</sup> In the social identity literature, these subgroup averages are called subgroup identities and distinguished from the personal identities generated for each person. In the case of status, the personal identity is equivalent to what is called S1 status, and the subgroup identity is equivalent to what is called S2 status (Jasso 2001).

closed.<sup>11, 12</sup>

### **2.1.3. Identity and Social Distance in the Palestinian Case**

Consider now the particular case to be investigated empirically in this paper – support among Palestinians for elements of the Roadmap peace initiative. Letting  $Y$  denote the level of support for an element of the Roadmap, we may write the support equation:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \sum \beta_k X_k + \sum \gamma_i I_i + \sum \delta_d D_d + e, \quad (5)$$

where the  $X$  vector denotes personal characteristics and other covariates, the  $I$  vector denotes identity variables, the  $D$  vector denotes the social distance variables, and  $e$  denotes a classical error.

The number and kind of identity variables included in the support equation depend on the substantive context and the available data. For example, identity variables may be constructed for each combination of valued quantitative characteristic, qualitative characteristic, and primordial outcome. Similarly, social distance variables may be constructed for each pair of subgroups identified for each identity distribution.

To illustrate, suppose that two of the identities consistent with the substantive context and the available data are: (1) identity based on status derived from schooling within the entire population; and (2) identity based on status derived from income within the entire population. Suppose further that two of the social distance variables consistent with the substantive context are: (1) social distance between the ethnic subgroups based on the status-schooling identities; and (2) social distance between the ethnic subgroups based on the status-income identities.

Of course, many other identities and social distance variables can be analyzed. For example, the relevant identities may be based not on the entire population but on subgroups –

---

<sup>11</sup> Of course, social distance can increase at different rates with the gap between the subgroups. For example, it can increase at a constant rate, or it can increase at an increasing rate, or it can increase at a decreasing rate. These possibilities can be investigated empirically, though unfortunately not with the data to be analyzed in this paper.

<sup>12</sup> Social distance between two subgroups is thus equivalent to the difference between two subgroup identities, as discussed in Chapter Y (this volume).

such as identity based on status derived from schooling within the ethnic subgroup or identity based on status derived from income within the sex-specific subgroup. Moreover, the identities in the support equation and the identities on which the social distance variables are based need not be matched sets. For example, a given support equation may include identities based on the subgroup, while the social distance variables may be based on identities based on the entire population.

Finally, note that the support equations corresponding to each of the Roadmap elements form a system of equations.

## **2.2. Empirical Setup**

Our objective is to analyze the part played by identity and social distance – two important aspects of the social climate – in the determination of support for peace.

### **2.2.1. Data and Data Procedures**

Data are drawn from a survey conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) in June 2003.<sup>13</sup> The sample was a probability sample of 1,318 adults age 18 and over drawn from the population residing in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Interviews were conducted in all sixteen geographic districts (or “governorates”), 11 in the West Bank and 5 in the Gaza Strip. A total of 120 localities were represented. The interviews were face-to-face, in-person interviews. Consistent with the youth of the overall age structure, persons under 22 were undersampled, and persons over 52 were oversampled (below, sampling weights are used for all percentages and arithmetic means).

The questionnaire included items tapping support for six elements of the Roadmap initiative, three of which pertain directly to violent activities. We will analyze those three items plus a fourth which taps a more generalized aspect of the peace initiative. The six items were prefaced by the following script:

---

<sup>13</sup> We acknowledge again our gratitude to the PCPSR which, under very difficult conditions, kindly provided the data.

“The Roadmap requires both Israel and the Palestinians to take several difficult steps on the way to a settlement. Assuming that Israel is fulfilling its part in the Roadmap promptly, do you agree or disagree to each of the following Palestinian steps?”

The response categories were: “Strongly agree;” “Agree;” “Disagree;” and “Strongly Disagree.” There was no neutral point. Respondents who expressed “Don’t know” or “No answer” were given a separate code.

The four items we will analyze are:

- Ending incitement against Israel by all official Palestinian institutions
- Declaring an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism, and undertaking efforts to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere
- Cutting off funding and all other forms of support for groups supporting and engaging in violence and terror
- Restoring pre-Intifada links between Arab states and Israel

The survey collected basic demographic and socioeconomic information, including age, sex, marital status, family size, and religion. Other basic information includes whether the respondent is a refugee and whether the respondent lives in a city, town/village, or refugee camp. The questionnaire also included questions on schooling, employment, and income. The schooling question has 7 categories: illiterate; elementary; preparatory; secondary; college; BA; and MA+. The income question has 4 response categories: less than 300 Jordanian dinars (JD); 300-600 JD; 601-900 JD; and more than 900 JD.

We now describe the procedure for constructing the identity variables. We illustrate it with one identity, the identity specified as based on status, schooling, and the entire population. The procedures use formula (3) and generate the status variable  $S$ . First, define the group within which status is derived. In this illustration, we define the group as the Palestinian population of

the West Bank and Gaza – i.e., the entire sample. Thus,  $N$  in formula (3) is equal to the number of respondents who provided information on schooling (1,310). Second, calculate each respondent's absolute rank, in ascending order. We used a procedure which assigns the average of the ranks to equal observations. Accordingly, the ranks generated consist of 7 distinct numbers which range from 65.5 to 1303; for example, 130 respondents fall in the illiterate category, and they are each coded 65.5. The absolute rank provides the quantity  $I$  for formula (3). Status  $S$  is then generated according to formula (3).

This same procedure was used to generate a large set of schooling-based identities, each varying the group within which status is derived from schooling. For example, one identity is sex-specific; in this case,  $N$  corresponds to the number of persons of the same gender as the respondent, and  $I$  corresponds to the respondent's absolute rank within the sex-specific subgroup.

Similarly, this procedure was used to generate income-based identities.

There are two main limitations in our implementation of this theory-based protocol for identity measurement. The first is that the two quantitative characteristics in the data are not measured very precisely. In principle, both variables should have numerous distinct observed values, with income possibly having hundreds.<sup>14</sup>

The second limitation is more substantive. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the entity within which status is derived is not the entire Palestinian population of West Bank and Gaza but rather the entire population of each district, including both Israelis and Palestinians. Calculation of the correct  $S$  under this scenario would require a sample of both Israelis and Palestinians. The  $N$  in the status formula would correspond to the entire adult population of the respondent's district and the rank  $I$  would correspond to the individual's absolute rank in the schooling distribution for all adults in the district.

---

<sup>14</sup> The lack of precise measurement also makes it difficult to calculate identities based on the justice primordial outcome. Although the justice setup accommodates both cardinal and ordinal quantitative characteristics, characteristics such as income are most appropriately treated as cardinal, something for which the four income categories do not lend themselves easily. Accordingly, we do not calculate justice-based identities.

Unfortunately, although a parallel survey was undertaken in Israel at the same time as the PCPSR survey we are analyzing, we have been unable to obtain the Israeli data. Thus, our representations of the identity variables may not be the substantively most appropriate representations.

As noted above, the identity variables just described are personal identities in the social identity literature, each calculated by formula (3). These identities provide scope for subgroup attachments only via the entity within which status is generated. But there is a further way in which subgroup attachments develop. Sociobehavioral theory suggests that if the subgroup identity (the average of the personal identities within a subgroup -- average  $S$ ) exceeds the personal identity, the individual will develop a strong attachment to the subgroup – the subgroup being the entity which enables enjoyment of a higher status than would otherwise be possible (Hornsey and Hogg 2002; Jasso 2001).

Once the identity variables are constructed, constructing the social distance variables is straightforward. For each group which has subgroups, the social distance between the subgroups in each pair of subgroups is measured as the difference between the average  $S$  in the subgroups. It is at this juncture that the data limitation just described is most apparent – although, as will be seen in the next section, our estimation procedures compensate for the lack of data. Note that the root conflict fueling Palestinians’ observed support for the Roadmap elements is a conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Thus, the social distance measure should be the difference between the Palestinians’ average  $S$  and the Israelis’ average  $S$ , separately in each district. But we do not have the data needed to construct  $S$  for Israelis. Thus, the district-specific social distance variables must remain unobservable; as noted, our estimation procedure will make it possible to estimate the effects of the unobservable district-specific social distance.<sup>15, 16</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup> We are exploring a number of second-best alternatives (and have not given up on the first-best option of obtaining the Israeli data). For example, one second-best alternative is to obtain population counts for adult Israelis and Palestinians in each district and use Israeli census data on schooling and income to construct synthetic schooling and income distributions and, hence, the ranks for the Palestinians (in the PCPSR sample) and the Israelis. The ranks and the

Note that it is also plausible that in addition to district-based social distance, there is a further overarching social distance generated by the difference in average status between all Israelis and all Palestinians. For example, the status based on income would generate a high magnitude of social distance, given the very large income differential between Israelis and Palestinians. Estimates of GDP per capita, expressed in PPP-adjusted constant U.S. dollars, are \$19,000 in Israel, \$800 in the West Bank, and \$600 in the Gaza Strip. (CIA World Factbook). Of course, a single overarching value of social distance for the entire sample is, in the cross-section, a constant.

### **2.2.2. Analytic Procedures**

#### **2.2.2.1. Specification and Estimation**

As discussed, the support variables are each measured on a category scale, and thus the basic support equation depicted in expression (5) must be adapted to the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. Accordingly, we specify an ordered logit equation.

The response categories did not include a zero point or neutral category, and thus the question immediately arises whether the “don’t-know/no-answer” responses constitute a neutral category. To address this question, we define two parallel sets of dependent variables, one omitting the “don’t-know/no-answer” responses and the other coding them as a neutral category and inserting them between the “agree” and “disagree” responses on the ordinal dependent variables. Examination of the pattern of coefficients, together with comparison to a multinomial logit specification, will enable assessment of the relative merits of the two treatments.

---

subgroup sizes are jointly sufficient to generate status, as shown in formula (3) and described above.

<sup>16</sup> The social distance measures just described pertain to residents of each district, representing the social distance between Palestinian and Israeli (i.e., Jewish settler) residents of each district. It is also possible that a second district-specific social distance is in play, and this pertains to the social distance between Palestinians and Israelis in the world of work, which given that before the Intifada Palestinians worked in Israeli areas need not coincide with their residence. This district-specific social distance, too, is unobservable and the estimation procedure will absorb it into the estimated district effect.

The specifications include as explanatory variables age and age-squared, as well as an indicator variable for whether the respondent is a refugee. Two other possible control variables are family size and marital status, and specifications are estimated with and without them.

Two identity variables are included in each specification, a schooling identity and an income identity. To address the question whether the most salient identities are identities based on the entire Palestinian population or identities based on some smaller grouping (such as sex-based identities), we estimate several versions of the same specification, each with a different set of identity variables, and compare the coefficients and their statistical significance.

A priori we expect one of the most important variables to be the social distance between Israelis and Palestinians within each district. As discussed above, we do not have data to allow construction of the social distance variables – one for schooling, the other for income. However, observe that given that the desired social distance variables are district-specific, the unmeasured social distance variables are embedded in a district dummy, and hence estimating a specification with district fixed effects enables testing for the operation of district-specific social distance. Of course, the district fixed effects embed other district-specific unmeasured variables as well, such as number of casualties and of houses demolished.<sup>17</sup>

It is possible that support for the Roadmap is also influenced by whether the respondent's place of residence is a city, a town/village, or a refugee camp. Accordingly, some of the specifications include this variable, represented by two binary regressors.

We also examine locality effects. Recall that the interviews were conducted in 120 localities, with approximately eleven respondents at each locality. To test for locality effects, we estimate a specification with locality fixed effects. Unfortunately, in the ordered-response framework, models with fixed effects in which each of the categories (localities in this case) has relatively few observations are vulnerable to the “incidental parameters problem” which renders

---

<sup>17</sup> As noted above, social distance in the region as a whole – between all Israelis and all Palestinians – is obviously a factor in Palestinian support for the roadmap. In cross-sectional data, however, whole-region social distance is a constant.

the estimates inconsistent (see Greene 2003:690, 697).

Finally, to correct for heteroskedasticity due to clustering by locality, the standard errors in specifications without locality fixed effects are Huber-corrected.

#### **2.2.2.2. Hypothesis Testing**

We carry out a variety of statistical tests. First, within each estimated equation, we carry out tests of the joint significance of sets of coefficients which together represent the operation of a single variable – performing joint tests for age and age-squared, for the city/town/camp dummies, for the district fixed effects, and for the locality fixed effects.

Next we conduct a full set of homogeneity tests. Within gender, we test the hypotheses that the explanatory factors influence the four dependent variables in the same way, separately for each specification, and that the cut-points are the same across the four dependent variables. We also test the hypothesis that the male and female respondents' equations have the same coefficients and the same cut-points, separately for each specification of each dependent variable.

### **3. RESULTS**

#### **3.1. Preliminaries**

Table 1 reports the response distributions for each of the four elements of the Roadmap, separately by gender.<sup>18</sup> The proportions supporting the Roadmap elements vary substantially, with the highest levels of support for ending incitement against Israel (56%) and the lowest level of support for cutting off funding for groups engaged in violence and terror (25%). As PCPSR staff have observed, it is possible that the discrepancy in level of support may be due to the use of terms such as “violence” and “terrorism” in some of the items, which “may have angered respondents” (PCPSR 2003). Certainly, it is evident that the two items which mention violence

---

<sup>18</sup> The figures in the tables do not include 30 non-Muslim respondents (18 Christians, 14 men and 4 women, and 12 respondents who did not provide information on religion). These cell sizes are too small to permit meaningful analysis of religious differences. Obviously, religious differences may be important, but larger sample size is needed to estimate them.

attract less support (Table 1, panels B and C) than the other two items (25% and 36% versus 41% and 56%). Note also that the incitement variable pertains to official Palestinian activities, while the arrest and funding items pertain to activist groups, some of whom are known for the high quality of their social services (Berman and Laitin, this volume).

– Table 1 about here –

The response distributions are very similar across gender, except that women are more likely than men to provide a “don’t-know/no-answer” response. The “don’t-know/no-answer” responses are relatively few, ranging from .55% to 3% among men and from 3% to 5% among women, suggesting the salience of the conflict and the peace initiative.

Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the principal respondent characteristics. Gender differences are visible in marital status (women are more likely to be married, and men more likely to be single) and in schooling, employment, and income. The percent illiterate is almost three times larger among women than among men. The proportion in school is five percentage points higher among men than among women. The proportion employed is over five times greater among men than among women.

– Table 2 about here –

Table 3 provides basic information on a subset of the identity measures we constructed. Four schooling identities are shown in panel A, one based on the entire Palestinian population, the second based on sex-specific subgroups, the third based on district-specific subgroups, and the fourth based on sex/district-specific subgroups. Parallel income identities are shown in panel B. The two sets of figures indicate that when identity is based on the entire Palestinian population or on district-specific populations, men derive more status than women – average status derived from schooling in the entire Palestinian sample is 1.11 among men versus .84 among women, for example, and in the districts, 1.08 versus .825. When status is based on sex-specific subgroups, average status is higher among women than among men (.994 versus .955 in the schooling measure and .935 versus .926 in the income measure). The sex/district-specific identities occupy an intermediate place; and the gender differential is trivial in the income measure but favors

women in the schooling measure.

– Table 3 about here –

Panels C and D each report six contrasts, for schooling and income identities, respectively. The first contrast highlights the difference between the all-based identity and the sex-based identity for each individual in the sample (in the social identity vocabulary, a contrast between two personal identities). As shown, all the men have a higher all-based schooling identity than a sex-based schooling identity. The exact opposite is true for women. Every woman in the sample derives higher status from the sex-based schooling identity than from the all-based schooling identity. These differentials raise the question whether men are more likely to assess their schooling relative to the entire population and women relative to women – a step which would enhance their experience of their own status.

The results for income identities are equally dramatic.

The second contrast pits the all-based identity against the sex-subgroup average of the all-based identities (in the vocabulary of social identity, this contrast is thus between a personal identity and a subgroup identity). Thus, to illustrate with the schooling identities, for each man in the sample we compare his all-based identity with the average for all men (1.11 in the first row of panel A), and, similarly, for each woman in the sample we compare her all-based identity with the average for all women (.84). As shown, among both sexes and for both schooling and income identities, the proportion whose personal identity exceeds the average for their sex is less than half. Thus, a majority will derive greater status from their subgroup than from their own attainments, a situation predicted to engender particular attachment and loyalty to the subgroup. Thus, both men and women may prefer to think of themselves as men and women – that is, defining themselves by their gender -- rather than as individuals.

The two sets of contrasts exemplify two distinct mechanisms by which identity operates. According to one mechanism, men would think of themselves as members of the entire group and women would think of themselves as members of the female subgroup. According to the other mechanism, however, both men and women would develop special attachments to sex-specific

subgroups. These gender results signal a pervasive operation of gender, a situation in need of much further research.

The third contrast highlights the difference between the all-based identity and the district-based identity for each individual in the sample (again, in the social identity vocabulary, this is a contrast between two personal identities). As shown, the majority of both men and women have a higher all-based schooling identity than a district-based schooling identity. However, even larger majorities of both men and women have a higher district-based income identity than an all-based income identity.

The fourth contrast pits the all-based identity against the district-subgroup average of the all-based identities (that is, using social identity vocabulary, this case contrasts a personal identity and a subgroup identity). Thus, to illustrate with the schooling identities, for each person in the sample we compare his/her all-based identity with the average for everyone in the district. As shown, among both sexes and for both schooling and income identities, the proportion whose personal identity exceeds the average for their district is less than half. Thus, a majority will derive greater status from their district-specific subgroup identity than from their own attainments, a situation predicted to engender particular attachment and loyalty to the district. Thus, Palestinians may prefer to think of themselves as members of a district – that is, defining themselves by their district -- rather than as individuals.

The two sets of district contrasts indicate that while one mechanism predicts greater attachment to the district for both schooling and income identities, the other mechanism predicts greater attachment to the district for the income identity but greater attachment to the Palestinian people as a whole for the schooling identity. Again, these results suggest the need for further research on these attachments and their possible differential salience.

The fifth contrast highlights the difference between the all-based identity and the sex/district-based identity for each individual in the sample (as noted, in the social identity vocabulary, this is a contrast between two personal identities). As shown, the majority of men have a higher all-based schooling identity than a sex/district-based schooling identity, but the

exact opposite holds for women. Meanwhile, the income identities indicate that a majority of both men and women have a higher sex/district-based income identity than an all-based income identity.

The sixth contrast pits the all-based identity against the sex/district-subgroup average of the all-based identities (again, using social identity vocabulary, this case contrasts a personal identity and a subgroup identity). Thus, to illustrate with the schooling identities, for each person in the sample we compare his/her all-based identity with the average for everyone in the sex/district-specific subgroup. As shown, among both sexes and for both schooling and income identities, the proportion whose personal identity exceeds the average for their sex/district subgroup is less than half. Thus, a majority will derive greater status from their sex/district-specific subgroup identity than from their own attainments, a situation predicted to engender particular attachment and loyalty to the sex/district subgroup. Thus, Palestinians may prefer to think of themselves as members of a sex/district subgroup.

The two sets of sex/district contrasts suggest greater attachment to the sex/district subgroup than to the Palestinian people as a whole except for one contrast involving the schooling-based identity among men. Again, these results suggest the need for further research on these attachments and their possible differential salience.

### **3.2. Multivariate Analyses**

Tables 4.a, 4.b, 4.c, and 4.d report estimates of three specifications of support for the four Roadmap elements, separately for men and women. The specifications include the all-based identities. All three specifications include, besides the two identities, age, age-squared, and the refugee binary variable. Specification 2 adds family size, the city/town/camp dummies, and the district fixed effects. Specification 3 replaces the city/town/camp dummies and the district fixed effects with locality fixed effects.

– Tables 4.1, 4.b, 4.c, and 4.d about here –

The district fixed effects in Specification 2 achieve high levels of statistical significance across all dependent variables and for both men and women, suggesting that district-level social

distance may be at work, joined, of course, by other unmeasured district-level factors. In contrast, the city/town/camp dummies achieve statistical significance only among men and only for the arrest element of the Roadmap (Table 4.b).

The identity results are unambiguous for men, less unambiguous for women. Among men, the schooling identities exert a uniformly negative effect on support for the Roadmap elements, with many of the coefficients reaching statistical significance. Thus, the higher the status derived from schooling, the lower the support for the Roadmap elements. This result is consistent with Krueger and Maleckova's (unpubl) result that higher-schooled persons are more supportive of violent activities against Israeli targets than lower-schooled persons. The opposite, however, appears to be the case for income. Men's income identities exert a uniformly positive effect on support for the Roadmap elements, although fewer coefficients reach statistical discernibility. Nonetheless, the pattern for men seems clear: the higher the status derived from schooling, the lower the support for the Roadmap; and the higher the status derived from income, the higher the support for the Roadmap. This pattern suggests a number of avenues for future work, such as analyzing the content of school curricula and exploring the notion that increasing income is more important for peace than increasing education. Note that these results are consistent with Lerner's (1958) idea that education radicalizes, especially when income is low.

The women's identity results are less unambiguous than the men's and fewer reach statistical discernibility; moreover, the pattern of effects differs as well. Among women, neither the schooling identities nor the income identities have coefficients of the same sign across all specifications and dependent variables. The schooling identities exert a negative effect on the three violence-related Roadmap elements (Tables 4.a, 4.b, and 4.c) but a positive effect on restoring pre-Intifada links between the Arab states and Israel. The income identities are negative for all dependent variables except for the funding element of the Roadmap (Table 4.c). Thus, the broad-brush result is that women's identities are more weakly related to support for elements of the Roadmap than are men's, and the direction of the effects is less stable, although mostly negative for both schooling and income identities. That is, the higher the status derived from

schooling and the status derived from income, the lower the support for the Roadmap. Note, however, the lack of statistical significance for most of the coefficients. This configuration of results is consistent with Moore's (2000) view that Palestinian women are in transition.

The age effects, though not very precisely estimated, suggest a (sex-specific) pattern in which age matters for some dependent variables but not for others. If we restrict attention to the age effects which reach statistical significance at a conventional .95 level, among men, age appears to affect only the restore-links element of the Roadmap (Table 4.d); the implied concave parabolas peak at age 38-39 in all three specifications. Thus, the results are consistent with greater support for restoring pre-Intifada links among persons in the 30-50 age range and less support among the younger and older.

Among women, the two age effects which reach statistical significance (in specification 2 of the arrest model and specification 1 of the funding model) yield convex parabolas in which the nadir is reached at around age 56-57. Thus, it would appear that support for the Roadmap is highest among young women and elderly women.

Finally, consider the locality effects. On the basis of the joint test, we can rule out a locality effect among men; but among women the locality effect achieves statistical significance in the equations for three of the four Roadmap elements (all except support for ending incitement against Israel). This result suggests a strong female attachment to place.<sup>19</sup> This result is consistent with restricted opportunities for women which thus confine them to their villages.

All the analyses just reported were repeated for different versions of the basic equations – treating the “don't-know/no-answer” responses as a neutral point or excluding them; including marital status in addition to or instead of family size; replacing the all-based identities with sex-based identities and district-based identities as well as identities based on other possible group definitions. All the results are very similar to the ones reported here.

---

<sup>19</sup> Note, however, that the specifications with the locality effects are vulnerable to the “incidental parameter problem” discussed earlier.

As noted earlier, the specification-specific/gender-specific equations for all four elements of the Roadmap form a system of equations. For example, the four men-only specification-1 equations (reported in the leftmost column of Tables 4.a, 4.b, 4.c, and 4.d) constitute a system in which all regressors are the same. Accordingly, we can test whether (1) the explanatory variables influence all four support dependent variables in the same way, and (2) the cut-points are the same across all four equations.

Table 5 reports the homogeneity-test results for men (panel A) and women (panel B). As shown, all tests reject homogeneity. Among both women and men, the four Roadmap elements have distinctive determination.

– Table 5 about here –

Similarly, we test for cross-gender homogeneity (panel C). Of the 24 tests, only three fail to reject homogeneity. Thus, we conclude that, as visible in the regression estimates, men's and women's equations differ significantly in their coefficients, and they also differ in their cut-points.

#### **4. CONCLUDING NOTE**

The results reported in this chapter provide evidence that Palestinian support for the elements of the Roadmap is linked to social distance between Palestinians and Israelis and to the status Palestinians derive from their schooling and income. Social distance appears to be district-specific. The identity effects are unambiguous among men – the greater the status derived from schooling, the lower the support for the Roadmap, but the greater the status derived from income, the greater the support for the Roadmap. Among women, the results are less unambiguous, and both schooling- and income-based identities exert a negative influence on support for the Roadmap. There are pervasive and striking gender differences, including a highly suggestive effect of the immediate locality among women but not among men.

This configuration of results prompts speculation about the social situation in the Palestinian territories. Among men, the schooling effect suggests that opportunities for the well-

educated may be meager except in the insurgency sector. For example, there may be few career paths at the present time except within Hamas, Jihad, and similar organizations, which require expertise across a broad set of activities, from management and financial administration to general strategy, weapons procurement and coordination, and so on. Meanwhile, the income effect suggests that war is bad for business, making it difficult to carry out construction projects, farm, herd animals, and engage in trade and tourism.

The results for women are suggestive of several possible mechanisms. First, the strong locality effect suggests an attachment among women to their immediate locale, which in turn could be related to attachment to their extended family or clan, including a sense of a joint vulnerability and common interests – that is, loyalty and solidarity with the clan – as well as possibly a less benign and more imposed confinement to home and village. Second, however, the women’s results are weak, suggesting that this might be a time of transition for Palestinian women, an old order giving way to a new one. Third, and along similar lines, the insurgency may have opened opportunities for women, opportunities both to use their skills and to earn income, consistent with the negative (albeit weak) effects of both schooling and income.<sup>20</sup>

Clearly, a critical question is whether peace or insurgency will be seen as more conducive to human development among the women and men of the Palestinian territories.

---

<sup>20</sup> In a documentary, “Women in Hezbollah,” filmmaker Maher Abi-Samra argues that Hezbollah has given women more freedom, more discretion, and a more influential role in society.

## REFERENCES

- Allport, Gordon W. 1954. The Nature of Prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Berman, Eli, and David Laitin. (This volume). "Rational Martyrs: Evidence from Data on Suicide Attacks."
- Blalock, Hubert M. 1956. "Economic Discrimination and Negro Increase." American Sociological Review 21:584-588.
- Blau, Peter M. 1974. "Presidential Address: Parameters of Social Structure." American Sociological Review 39:615-635.
- Bogardus, Ernest S. 1925. "Social Distance and Its Origins." Sociology and Social Research 9:216-225.
- Clausewitz, Karl von. (1832-1834) 1943. On War. Translated from the German by O. I. Matthijs Jolles. New York: Modern Library.
- Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. 1968. "Sociology: The Development of Sociological Thought." Pp. 23-36 in David L. Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Volume 15. New York: Macmillan.
- Ellemers, Naomi, Russell Spears, and Bertjan Doosje. 2002. "Self and Social Identity." Annual Review of Psychology 53:161-186.
- Goode, William J. 1978. The Celebration of Heroes: Prestige as a Control System. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Greene, William H. 2003. Econometric Analysis. Fifth edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Hogg, Michael A., Deborah J. Terry, and Katherine M. White. 1995. "A Tale of Two Theories: A Critical Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory." Social Psychology Quarterly 58:255-269.
- Hornsey, Matthew J., and Michael A. Hogg. 2002. "The Effects of Status on Subgroup Relations." British Journal of Social Psychology 41:203-218.
- Jasso, Guillermina. 2001. "Studying Status: An Integrated Framework." American Sociological

- Review 66:96-124.
- Komarovsky, Mirra. [1944] 1966. "Social Distance." P. 281 in Henry Pratt Fairchild (Ed.), Dictionary of Sociology. Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, and Company.
- Krueger, Alan B., and Jitka Maleckova. Unpubl. "Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?"
- LaPiere, Richard T. 1938. "The Sociological Significance of Measurable Attitudes." American Sociological Review 3:175-182.
- Lerner, Daniel. 1958. The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East. New York: Macmillan.
- Laumann, Edward O., and Richard Senter. "Subjective Social Distance, Occupational Stratification, and Forms of Status and Class Consciousness: A Cross-national Replication and Extension." American Journal of Sociology 81:1304-1338.
- Merton, Robert K. [1949, 1957] 1968. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press.
- Mishal, Shaul, and Avraham Sela. 2000. The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Moore, Dahlia. 2000. "Gender Identity, Nationalism, and Social Action among Jewish and Arab Women in Israel: Redefining the Social Order?" Gender Issues 18:3-28.
- Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. 2003. "Public Opinion Poll #8." [www.pcpsr.org](http://www.pcpsr.org)
- Park, Robert. 1924. "The Concept of Social Distance." Journal of Applied Sociology 8:339-344.
- Smelser, Neil J. 1967. Sociology: An Introduction. New York: Wiley.
- Sørensen, Aage B. 1979. "A Model and a Metric for the Analysis of the Intragenerational Status Attainment Process." American Journal of Sociology 85:361-84.
- Stets, Jan, and Peter J. Burke. 2000. "Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory." Social Psychology Quarterly 63:224-237.
- Stryker, Sheldon. 1968. "Identity Salience and Role Performance." Journal of Marriage and the

Family 4:558-564.

- \_\_\_\_\_, and Richard T. Serpe. 1994. "Identity Salience and Psychological Centrality: Equivalent, Overlapping, or Complementary Concepts?" Social Psychology Quarterly 57:16-35.
- Tajfel, Henri. 1974. "Social Identity and Intergroup Behavior." Social Science Information 13:65-93.
- Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. 1979. "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict." Pp. 33-47 in W. G. Austin and S. Worchel (eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey: Brooks-Cole.
- Van Natta, Don, Jr. 2003. "The Terror Industry Fields Its Ultimate Weapon." The New York Times, 27 August 2003.
- Williams, Robin M. 1947. The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions. New York: Social Science Research Council.

**Table 1. Support Among Palestinians for Four Elements of the Roadmap: June 2003**

<b>Strength of Agreement/Disagreement</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>Women</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>A. Ending incitement against Israel by all official Palestinian institutions</b>			
Strongly agree	5.49	4.36	4.94
Agree	51.0	50.9	51.0
Disagree	34.6	33.9	34.2
Strongly Disagree	8.35	6.74	7.56
DK/NA	.55	4.17	2.32
<b>B. Declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism, and undertake efforts to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere</b>			
Strongly agree	2.68	2.32	2.50
Agree	31.0	35.6	33.3
Disagree	46.1	41.9	44.0
Strongly Disagree	18.3	17.1	17.7
DK/NA	1.98	3.06	2.51
<b>C. Cutting off funding and all other forms of support for groups supporting and engaging in violence and terror</b>			
Strongly agree	2.54	1.90	2.23
Agree	22.9	22.1	22.5
Disagree	53.5	50.2	51.9
Strongly Disagree	18.1	20.6	19.3
DK/NA	2.97	5.14	4.03
<b>D. Arab states restore pre-Intifada links with Israel (trade offices, etc.)</b>			
Strongly agree	1.89	2.83	2.35
Agree	38.5	39.3	38.9
Disagree	44.2	40.0	42.1
Strongly Disagree	14.1	12.8	13.4
DK/NA	1.37	5.16	3.23

*Notes:* Sample consists of 633 women and 650-654 men living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Percentages based on weighted data.

**Table 2. Respondent Characteristics, Palestinian Sample: June 2003**

<b>Characteristic</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>Women</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>A. Personal characteristics</b>			
Age in years (standard deviation)	34.2 (12.5)	34.8 (12.2)	34.5 (12.3)
Percent married	66.6	76.0	71.2
Percent single	32.3	19.4	26.0
Family size (standard deviation)	7.43 (3.17)	7.32 (3.35)	7.38 (3.26)
Percent refugee	47.9	48.7	48.3
<b>B. Schooling distribution (percentage)</b>			
Illiterate	4.04	11.5	7.70
Elementary	13.4	15.3	14.3
Preparatory	24.8	27.3	26.0
Secondary	34.0	29.3	31.7
College	8.10	8.61	8.35
BA	13.8	7.86	10.9
MA+	1.86	.16	1.03
<b>C. Employment distribution (percentage)</b>			
Not employed -- in school	14.1	8.82	11.5
Not employed -- housewife	.25	76.5	37.6
Not employed – retired	1.59	.10	.86
Not employed – other	19.8	2.06	11.1
Employed	64.3	12.6	38.9
<b>D. Income distribution (percentage)</b>			
Less than JD 300	67.2	71.1	69.1
JD 300-600	25.0	23.9	24.4
JD 601-900	5.05	3.01	4.05
More than JD 900	2.60	1.42	2.02
DK/NA	1.37	5.16	3.23

*Notes:* Sample consists of 633 women and 650-654 men living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Percentages and means based on weighted data.

**Table 3. Identity Measures, Palestinian Sample: June 2003**

<b>Identity Measure</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>Women</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>A. Schooling-based/status-based personal identities (averages)</b>			
Based on entire sample	1.11	.840	.975
Based on sex-specific subsamples	.955	.994	.974
Based on district-specific subsamples	1.08	.825	.957
Based on sex/district-specific subsamples	.924	.959	.941
<b>B. Income-based/status-based personal identities (averages)</b>			
Based on entire sample	.983	.879	.932
Based on sex-specific subsamples	.926	.935	.931
Based on district-specific subsamples	.948	.840	.895
Based on sex/district-specific subsamples	.883	.882	.883
<b>C. Schooling-based/status-based identity contrasts</b>			
Percent for whom all-based identity exceeds identity based on sex-specific subsample	100	0	51.0
Percent for whom all-based identity exceeds sex-specific average of all-based identities	23.7	45.9	34.6
Percent for whom all-based identity exceeds identity based on district-specific subsample	55.8	57.1	56.4
Percent for whom all-based identity exceeds district-specific average of all-based identities	43.2	32.7	38.1
Percent for whom all-based identity exceeds identity based on sex/district-specific subsample	73.7	30.7	52.7
Percent for whom all-based identity exceeds sex/district-specific average of all-based identities	34.6	45.5	40.0
<b>D. Income-based/status-based identity contrasts</b>			
Percent for whom all-based identity exceeds identity based on sex-specific subsample	100	0	51.1
Percent for whom all-based identity exceeds sex-specific average of all-based identities	32.8	28.9	30.9
Percent for whom all-based identity exceeds identity based on district-specific subsample	36.6	36.9	36.7
Percent for whom all-based identity exceeds district-specific average of all-based identities	29.0	23.9	26.5
Percent for whom all-based identity exceeds identity based on sex/district-specific subsample	49.4	28.8	39.3
Percent for whom all-based identity exceeds sex/district-specific average of all-based identities	28.5	23.9	26.2

*Notes:* Identities are constructed by calculating the individual's schooling-based status within a given social unit; here we constructed four sets of identities, one based on the entire sample and the other three based on subsamples, a sex-specific subsample, a district-specific subsample, and a sex/district-specific subsample. The computational formula for status is  $\ln[(N+1)/(N+1-i)]$ , where  $i$  denotes the individual's raw rank within the group and  $N$  denotes the group size. See text for further details.

**Table 4.a. Ordered-Logit Models of Support for Ending Incitement Against Israel: Palestinian Survey, June 2003**

Regressor	Men			Women		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
Selected estimates						
age	-.0112 (.44)	-.0176 (.69)	-.0206 (.61)	.0320 (.99)	.0235 (.71)	.0383 (1.14)
age squared	.000143 (.48)	.000225 (.75)	.000263 (.64)	-.000458 (1.11)	-.000357 (.84)	-.000559 (1.39)
refugee	-.231 (1.54)	.00700 (.04)	.107 (.04)	-.271 (1.78)	-.290 (1.54)	.0130 (.05)
schooling identity Ed-All-Status	-.158 (2.02)	-.134 (1.58)	-.241 (2.49)	-.137 (1.16)	-.128 (1.07)	-.150 (1.10)
income identity Inc-All-Status	.147 (1.80)	.152 (1.52)	.181 (1.58)	-.179 (1.82)	-.135 (1.11)	-.0613 (.50)
family size	---	.0343 (1.39)	.167 (.58)	---	.0288 (1.23)	.0211 (.73)
Wald/likelihood ratio chi-squared	11.73	---	137.23	10.41	---	166.37
df	5	21	125	5	21	125
Joint tests, chi squared						
age and age squared	.27	.61	.42	1.53	1.11	3.07
city/town/camp dummies (2)	---	2.11	---	---	.52	---
district categories (15)	---	73.19	---	---	211.17	---
locality dummies (119)	---	---	113.93	---	---	129.94
Number of observations	652	651	651	630	630	630

*Notes:* Absolute values of asymptotic *t*-ratios under parameter estimates; standard errors in Models 1 and 2 Huber-corrected for clustering on locality. Cut-points not shown.

**Table 4.b. Ordered-Logit Models of Support for Arresting Violent Attackers of Israel: Palestinian Survey, June 2003**

Regressor	Men			Women		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
Selected estimates						
age	.0106 (.39)	.0131 (.48)	.0188 (.57)	-.00382 (1.58)	-.0485 (1.74)	-.0183 (.59)
age squared	-.0000277 (.09)	-.0000445 (.14)	-.000102 (.26)	.000312 (1.09)	.000435 (1.30)	.000417 (.11)
refugee	.00871 (.05)	.547 (2.59)	.673 (2.41)	-.599 (3.78)	-.461 (2.16)	-.371 (1.51)
schooling identity Ed-All-Status	-.108 (1.15)	-.104 (1.06)	-.143 (1.45)	-.275 (2.69)	-.205 (1.87)	-.0573 (.43)
income identity Inc-All-Status	.169 (1.93)	.220 (2.26)	.238 (2.12)	-.129 (1.51)	-.160 (1.58)	-.187 (1.55)
family size	---	-.0326 (1.41)	-.0508 (1.84)	---	.0239 (1.03)	.0331 (1.16)
Wald/likelihood ratio chi-squared	7.03	---	168.01	31.68	---	222.05
df	5	21	125	5	21	125
Joint tests, chi squared						
age and age squared	3.34	3.17	2.70	5.74	6.04	4.58
city/town/camp dummies (2)	---	15.92	---	---	.69	---
district categories (15)	---	34.82	---	---	101.25	---
locality dummies (119)	---	---	138.71	---	---	156.97
Number of observations	650	649	649	630	630	630

*Notes:* Absolute values of asymptotic *t*-ratios under parameter estimates; standard errors in Models 1 and 2 Huber-corrected for clustering on locality. Cut-points not shown.

**Table 4.c. Ordered-Logit Models of Support for Cutting Off Funding for Groups Engaged in Terror and Violence Against Israel: Palestinian Survey, June 2003**

Regressor	Men			Women		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
Selected estimates						
age	-.0133 (.48)	-.0167 (.61)	-.0261 (.77)	-.0517 (2.09)	-.0463 (1.72)	-.0647 (2.00)
age squared	.000243 (.74)	.000296 (.92)	.000436 (1.07)	.000455 (1.67)	.000399 (1.35)	.000649 (1.72)
refugee	.00461 (.03)	.165 (.84)	.262 (.94)	-.579 (3.00)	-.230 (.93)	-.0382 (.15)
schooling identity Ed-All-Status	-.139 (1.61)	-.137 (1.46)	-.199 (2.00)	-.285 (2.75)	-.212 (1.92)	-.127 (.92)
income identity Inc-All-Status	.152 (1.68)	.202 (1.94)	.252 (2.21)	.0454 (.52)	.0170 (.19)	.0800 (.64)
family size	---	.0111 (.45)	.00827 (.29)	---	-.000735 (.03)	.00729 (.25)
Wald/likelihood ratio chi-squared	5.70	---	174.39	19.84	---	290.47
df	5	21	125	5	21	125
Joint tests, chi squared						
age and age squared	1.86	2.58	3.15	7.09	4.91	5.15
city/town/camp dummies (2)	---	4.21	---	---	4.70	---
district categories (15)	---	82.10	---	---	159.08	---
locality dummies (119)	---	---	143.97	---	---	195.81
Number of observations	648	647	647	630	630	630

*Notes:* Absolute values of asymptotic *t*-ratios under parameter estimates; standard errors in Models 1 and 2 Huber-corrected for clustering on locality. Cut-points not shown.

**Table 4.d. Ordered-Logit Models of Support for Restoring Pre-Intifada Links with Israel: Palestinian Survey, June 2003**

Regressor	Men			Women		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
Selected estimates						
age	-.0773 (2.67)	-.0825 (2.92)	-.0970 (2.79)	.0252 (1.03)	.0233 (.94)	.0535 (1.72)
age squared	.000988 (2.86)	.00105 (3.20)	.00128 (3.01)	-.000179 (.62)	-.000159 (.54)	-.000540 (1.49)
refugee	.0686 (.43)	.387 (1.79)	.0756 (.27)	-.326 (1.90)	-.155 (.69)	.0568 (.23)
schooling identity Ed-All-Status	-.176 (2.18)	-.169 (2.00)	-.159 (1.64)	0.157 (.16)	.0619 (.64)	.0551 (.42)
income identity Inc-All-Status	.0906 (1.02)	.107 (1.03)	.0929 (.81)	-.0563 (.63)	-.0929 (.87)	-.127 (1.05)
family size	---	-.0103 (.38)	-.0318 (1.11)	---	-.0110 (.38)	-.0349 (1.23)
Wald/likelihood ratio chi-squared	16.32	---	191.53	8.74	---	227.41
df	5	21	125	5	21	125
Joint tests, chi squared						
age and age squared	8.92	11.55	9.75	3.58	3.02	3.72
city/town/camp dummies (2)	---	5.06	---	---	2.84	---
district categories (15)	---	94.29	---	---	189.80	---
locality dummies (119)	---	---	137.37	---	---	181.53
Number of observations	651	650	650	630	630	630

*Notes:* Absolute values of asymptotic *t*-ratios under parameter estimates; standard errors in Models 1 and 2 Huber-corrected for clustering on locality. Cut-points not shown.

**Table 5. Cross-Equation Homogeneity Tests**

<b>Test</b>	<b>Chi-Squared</b>	<b>df</b>
<b>A. Men Only</b>		
Specification 1 coefficients the same across 4 DVs	24.20	15
Specification 1 cut-points the same across 4 DVs	66.07	12
Specification 2 coefficients the same across 4 DVs	2351.51	69
Specification 2 cut-points the same across 4 DVs	75.65	12
Specification 3 coefficients the same across 4 DVs	5634.38	375
Specification 3 cut-points the same across 4 DVs	49.71	12
<b>B. Women Only</b>		
Specification 1 coefficients the same across 4 DVs	40.63	15
Specification 1 cut-points the same across 4 DVs	36.57	12
Specification 2 coefficients the same across 4 DVs	1782.96	69
Specification 2 cut-points the same across 4 DVs	28.71	12
Specification 3 coefficients the same across 4 DVs	7355.37	375
Specification 3 cut-points the same across 4 DVs	27.28	12
<b>C. Cross-Gender Tests</b>		
DV1, Specification 1 coefficients the same	9.83	5
DV1, Specification 1 cut-points the same	22.33	4
DV2, Specification 1 coefficients the same	24.54	5
DV2, Specification 1 cut-points the same	11.71	4
DV3, Specification 1 coefficients the same	16.67	5
DV3, Specification 1 cut-points the same	8.63	4
DV4, Specification 1 coefficients the same	14.34	5
DV4, Specification 1 cut-points the same	25.26	4
DV1, Specification 2 coefficients the same	127.94	23
DV1, Specification 2 cut-points the same	21.15	4
DV2, Specification 2 coefficients the same	187.32	5
DV2, Specification 2 cut-points the same	12.19	4
DV3, Specification 2 coefficients the same	291.36	23

DV3, Specification 2 cut-points the same	11.34	4
DV4, Specification 2 coefficients the same	103.64	23
DV4, Specification 2 cut-points the same	20.80	4
DV1, Specification 3 coefficients the same	180.30	125
DV1, Specification 3 cut-points the same	22.14	4
DV2, Specification 3 coefficients the same	315.71	125
DV2, Specification 3 cut-points the same	4.43	4
DV3, Specification 3 coefficients the same	3092.01	125
DV3, Specification 3 cut-points the same	10.87	4
DV4, Specification 3 coefficients the same	1287.70	125
DV4, Specification 3 cut-points the same	18.45	4

*Notes:* For specifications, see Table 4.

DV1 = support for ending incitement against Israel

DV2 = support for arresting violent attackers of Israel

DV3 = support for cutting off funding for groups engaged in terror against Israel

DV4 = support for restoring pre-intifada links with Israel